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Located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center is a direct reporting unit of Headquarters, United States Air Force. It is the Air Force independent test agency responsible for testing, under operationally realistic conditions, new systems being developed for Air Force and multi-service use. AFOTEC employs more than 600 military and civilian personnel at its headquarters and five detachments located at Edwards AFB, California, Peterson AFB, Colo., Eglin AFB, Florida, Nellis AFB, Nev., and Kirtland AFB, N.M., and multiple operating locations around the country. Test teams conduct tests at selected sites; collect, analyze and evaluate the data; and prepare formal reports. The teams are managed by AFOTEC and include personnel from the operating and supporting commands who will eventually employ these systems. AFOTEC's independent and objective evaluations of how well systems will meet operational requirements provide a vital link between the developer and user. They are key elements of the system acquisition approval process. Operational tests are designed to address critical issues regarding a system's performance in combat-like environments when operated by field personnel. They seek to answer questions about how safe, effective, reliable, maintainable, compatible and logistically supportable new Air Force systems will be. The results of AFOTEC's tests, normally conducted on prototype and pre-production models, play an important role in Air Force and DOD acquisition decisions. Test results also identify deficiencies requiring corrective action. ==History== In addition to the study of fielded weapons used in Vietnam, a new Department of Defense leadership team began major reforms when the new Richard M. Nixon administration began in 1969. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, the esteemed entrepreneur who favored the "fly-before-buy" approach, and Undersecretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas, who dealt with operational problems with the F-111 and C-5 transport, took the lead in defining a new emphasis on OT&E. Several government committees, commissions, and agencies studied how to implement acquisition reform, including the benefits of independent operational test and evaluation. Participants in all of these studies, along with an increasing number of Senators and Congressmen, concluded that the developing and using commands had become less impartial about the capabilities of, and need for, their major acquisition programs. In July 1970, a Presidential Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended the creation of an OT&E organization in each service, independent from the developer and user, and reporting directly to the chief of each service. Deputy Secretary Packard quickly started to implement the Panel's recommendations. By November 1971, Congress showed its support for OT&E by requiring that the services submit OT&E results before procuring new systems. Congress expected the independent operational test agency in each service to test and evaluate a system relative to two questions: Is the system operationally effective? and Is the system operationally suitable?. Operational effectiveness addresses how well a system performed the mission for which it was designed. Operational suitability, on the other hand, examined if a system could be maintained, kept available, and was reliable in the operational environment. Some members of the Air Staff, unfavorably recalling the contributions of the Air Proving Ground Command, attempted to find alternatives to creating a new, independent OT&E organization. They contended that internal changes were the first step. Air Force leadership also adopted a new dichotomy in which developing commands would typically conduct developmental test and evaluation while the using commands would usually conduct operational test and evaluation. Senior Air Force leadership believed these changes could bring to the Air Force the balance and independence Congress and the Department of Defense favored for each service. In 1973, John L. McLucas became Secretary of the Air Force, and General George S. Brown became the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In September 1973, General Brown ordered the Air Staff to plan for a new independent OT&E agency. On 11 December 1973, a directive from Headquarters Air Force established the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, effective 1 January 1974. The Center achieved initial operational capability in April 1974 and full operational capability by October 1974. AFTEC's Early Years AFTEC's charter largely addressed the criticisms of OT&E and the Blue Panel's recommendations. For example, as a Separate Operating Agency, the Center reported directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as a means of ensuring independence from the developing and using commands. AFTEC test teams would consist of specialists who would operate and maintain the systems after deployment. The Center would provide the results of its evaluations to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff in support of key decision points in the acquisition process. And, AFTEC would conduct impartial tests under conditions as close to those encountered in the field. At the same time, the Air Force also took steps to avoid creating another APGC. AFTEC would be a small management headquarters with approximately 200 personnel, and AFTEC would never own any of the systems it tested. The charter and subsequent events showed the Air Force's reluctance to turn all OT&E over to the new Center. Although AFTEC declared full operational capability in October 1974, by the end of its first year, the Center had responsibility to test only 32 OT&E programs, while the major commands continued to conduct OT&E on their programs of interest. AFTEC was limited to monitoring OT&E of smaller acquisition programs at the major commands. Another obstacle arose because AFTEC was such a small organization that it had to rely heavily on the major commands to provide personnel for test teams and funds for OT&E. In October 1976, Major General Howard W. Leaf assumed command of AFTEC, and gradually implemented changes that enhanced AFTEC's role in OT&E conducted at the major commands. Major General Leaf, promoted to Lieutenant General and reassigned as inspector general of the Air Force, departed AFTEC in May 1980. By that time, he had helped find solutions to AFTEC's budgeting process, forged closer relationships with the major commands, and had established three levels of AFTEC effort for monitoring major command OT&E programs. Like his predecessors and successors as AFTEC commander, Major General Leaf sought to involve OT&E testers as early as possible in programs identified for OT&E to help ensure system readiness for test and that tests reflected the needs of users of the new systems. Early OT&E also played a role in ensuring the "fix-before-buy" approach had a chance to save resources by finding problems before production, thereby avoiding costly modifications to fielded systems. As a whole, Major General Leaf's time as AFTEC commander stabilized the new organization and made it a more active participant in Air Force OT&E. From AFTEC to Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center AFTEC's increasing contributions to Air Force OT&E led the Center to create detachments and operating locations dedicated to conducting AFTEC's OT&E mission. While AFTEC headquarters remained at Kirtland AFB, detachments activated at numerous locations, including Kapaun, Germany, Eglin AFB, Florida, Edwards AFB, California, and Nellis AFB, Nevada. Detachments tended to support relatively broad categories of test—fighter aircraft, large aircraft, and munitions, for example. Operating locations, smaller than the detachments and located throughout the United States, tended to focus on individual systems. On 4 April 1983, the Center was redesignated the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center. This title more accurately described its unique mission of evaluating the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of new systems. It also clearly delineated its role as the Air Force's operational test agency. Congress, with an increased interest in understanding the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of major Department of Defense acquisition programs, directed the creation of a new position, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in September 1983. Congress required that the Director, Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) would report directly, without intervening review or approval, to the Secretary of Defense and to Congress. One of the requirements Congress levied on DOT&E was to create, maintain, and update a list of major Department of Defense acquisition programs, and to prepare an annual report to Congress, informing that body about the progress of programs with high interest and visibility in Congress. End of the Cold War Brings More Change Unrest in Europe in 1989 brought the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year, and ultimately the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States began to dramatically reduce the size of its armed services shortly thereafter. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak announced the consolidation of several Air Force major commands and personnel reductions as part of the overall Department of Defense reductions. As part of these reductions and reorganization, the Air Force changed its Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Separate Operating Agencies (SOAs) to field operating agencies and assigned them to appropriate functional chiefs at Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Because of AFOTEC's charter as an independent test agency that reported directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Center became one of only three Direct Reporting Units in the Air Force on 5 February 1991. Several proposals to consolidate Air Force OT&E at AFOTEC also circulated during broad area reviews associated with reorganizing the Air Force. The U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, for example, addressed the feasibility of expanding AFOTEC's role and scope of responsibility for the entire test and evaluation process, from the initial statement of need to the last major upgrade of a system. A Department of Defense Inspector General report used a different perspective and criticized the Air Force for not having a single operational test agency. In September 1991, Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Donald B. Rice and General McPeak created a new office in the Air Staff, the Director of Test and Evaluation. Retired Lieutenant General Howard W. Leaf became the first Director of Test and Evaluation in October 1991, and two months later, proposed consolidating OT&E at AFOTEC. As part of the Air Force reorganization and drawdown, General McPeak directed that the Center not only continue its lead role in multi-service OT&E, but also the consolidation of all initial and qualification OT&E and select follow-on OT&E at AFOTEC by 1 June 1992. By design, this meant General McPeak limited the type and scope of testing the major commands could perform in the future. Overnight, the number of AFOTEC-conducted tests rose first from 47 to 186, and ultimately to more than 200. General McPeak also announced that AFOTEC would receive additional personnel to ensure it could meet its newly expanded mission. The Center's mission grew again on 1 October 1997 when AFOTEC absorbed the personnel and workload of the Defense Evaluation Support Activity (DESA). DESA, which had experience with rapid test, was heavily involved in testing advanced concept technology demonstrations, which sought out innovative applications for emerging technologies to create prototype systems for examination by operational units. While "fly-before-buy" has repeatedly proven its worth in thorough testing of systems and avoidance of later problems, the Air Force even in the twenty-first century remains severely hampered by a "buy-fly-fix" approach. Literally billions of dollars have been spent in making weapons systems operational after they have entered squadron service. For example, the Rockwell B-1B Lancer suffered repeated such problems. When declared operational, apart from nuclear weapons, the only conventional weapon the B-1 could use were free-fall bombs. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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